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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
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State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

No, 940558

v.
FILED
James Fred Gordon,
Defendant and Appellant.

March 11, 1996

First District, Box Elder County
The Honorable Ben H. Hadfield
Attorneys:

Jan Graham, Att'y Gen., Todd A. Utzinger, Asst.
Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff
Kent E. Snider, Michael D. Bowhuis, Ogden, for
defendant

HOWE, Justice:
Defendant appeals from a conviction for possession of a
controlled substance with intent to distribute, a second degree
felony. Pursuant to rule 43 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, the court of appeals certified the case to this court.
I.

FACTS

On appeal from a jury verdict, we view the evidence and
all reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to that
verdict and recite the facts accordingly. Cornia v. Wilcox, 898
P.2d 1379, 1382 (Utah 1995); State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 120506 (Utah 1993). On December 17, 1982, defendant James Fred
Gordon was staying at the Brigham City apartment of his ex-wife,
Ann Marie Frigon, as he occasionally did after their divorce six
years earlier. That day, Frigon was ^shocked" to learn that she
was pregnant with Gordon's child. At about six or seven o'clock
that evening, Gordon left the apartment, telling Frigon that he
would be back in five minutes. Instead, he went to a bar and
then to a friend's house, returning to the apartment about six
o'clock the next morning. Frigon was angry with Gordon,
especially after smelling his shirt, which ^reeked of cologne,"

as she imagined that he had been with another woman.
argued briefly before Gordon went to sleep.

The two

A few hours later, Frigon found a plastic bag
containing the drug lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD). She called
the Brigham City Police Department and reported that Gordon was
at her apartment and that he had some drugs. She met two
officers outside her apartment and told them that there was LSD
inside. Frigon explained that she knew it was LSD because Gordon
had told her so and because she had seen him with LSD before.
She stated that the LSD had fallen out of his coat pocket onto
the floor and that she was afraid her young child might find and
possibly eat it. Frigon gave the officers permission to enter
her apartment to get the drugs.
Once inside the apartment, Frigon opened a closet and
showed them the plastic bag protruding from a coat pocket. The
bag contained a piece of graph paper with a unicorn design on it.
Each square on the graph paper contained one dose or "hit" of
LSD, and there were approximately sixty-five to seventy "hits"
remaining on the paper.
The officers awoke Gordon and asked him to accompany
them to the police station. He agreed and, while dressing, was
advised of his Miranda rights. He asked the officers why they
wanted to talk to him. They told him about the LSD in his coat
pocket. Gordon responded, "Well, I know you've got me. What's
the punishment for that?" One of the officers told Gordon he did
not know what charges he would face. Gordon asked Frigon if she
had told the police about the drugs. When she remained silent,
he asked her why. She responded, "Well, because I wanted to
protect my family."
At the police station, an officer read Gordon a written
consent form explaining his Miranda rights which Gordon signed.
Gordon admitted that the LSD was his. He explained that he had
obtained it from someone in Salt Lake City, but he refused to
identify the person. He said he did not intend to sell it.
An officer then called the county attorney to ask what
charges should be filed. Due to the large number of doses of
LSD, the county attorney told the officer to charge Gordon with
possession with intent to distribute, a second degree felony.
The officer told Gordon about the charges and possible penalties
were he to be convicted. The officers then asked him if he would
give them a written or taped statement. He refused and said he
would no longer talk with them until he had spoken to an
attorney.
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II.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The procedural history of this case is rather complex,
but it is relevant in analyzing the merits of Gordon's appeal.
At Gordon's first appearance at the circuit court in Brigham
City, Box Elder County, the judge found him to be indigent and
appointed attorney Clinton S. Judkins to represent him.
Unbeknownst to Gordon, at that time Judkins was a part-time
prosecutor for the city of Tremonton, also located in Box Elder
County. Following a jury trial on April 26, 1983, Gordon was
convicted of the charged offense and later sentenced to a term of
one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison.
Judkins, on Gordon's behalf, filed a timely notice of
appeal. Later, Judkins filed a motion for a new trial based on
newly discovered evidence, but the trial court denied the motion
as untimely. In October 1983, the appeal was dismissed for
failure to prosecute.
In July 1992, nearly nine years later, Gordon filed a
motion in the trial court to be resentenced nunc pro tunc1
because of his attorney's failure to prosecute his appeal. He
contended that his constitutional right to an appeal was denied
because Judkins had failed to pursue the appeal due to his
conflict of interest as a city prosecutor. The court denied the
motion as untimely and not supported "with sufficient affidavits
or memoranda as required by law."
In January 1993, Gordon petitioned for a writ of
postconviction relief. After an evidentiary hearing, the court
denied the petition. In doing so, the court examined the
retroactivity of State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 857-59 (Utah
1992), in which we announced a prohibition against the
appointment of attorneys with concurrent prosecutorial duties to
represent indigent criminal defendants and a per se rule of
reversal in such cases. The court concluded that Brown was not
intended to be applied retroactively. Gordon appealed from that
decision to this court.

1

Nunc pro tunc "applie[s] to acts allowed to be done after
the time when they should be done . . . with the same effect as
if regularly done." Black's Law Dictionary 964 (5th ed. 1979);
see also State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 38 n.l (Utah 1981) ("Nunc
pro tunc, which means *now for then,' is probably a misnomer for
this circumstance, where the court is resentencing to give the
judgment of conviction not retroactive but present effect—%then
for now.'").
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Without conducting plenary review of Gordon's claims,
we issued a September 24, 1993 order stating in its entirety:
Having decided that Gordon was denied
his constitutional right to appeal, this
court remands the case to the trial court for
resentencing, so that Gordon may raise the
issues here presented in a first appeal as of
right. State v. Hallett, [856 P.2d 1060,
1062 n.2 (Utah 1993)], noting proper
resentencing procedure outlined in State v.
Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 38 (Utah 1981)[,] is
under coram vobis through rule 65B(b),
formerly rule 65B(i), of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
The trial court is directed to have
counsel on appeal appointed for defendant.
On remand, the trial court resentenced Gordon nunc pro tunc to
the same term as it had originally, one to fifteen years.
With new counsel, Gordon filed a motion for a new trial
based upon (1) ineffective assistance of trial counsel because of
his appointed defense counsel's concurrent position as a city
prosecutor, and (2) newly discovered evidence in the form of a
new witness, Danny Burke, one of Gordon's fellow inmates, who
allegedly stated in 1983 that he was the owner of the drugs, that
he had left them at Frigon's apartment, and that Gordon had no
knowledge of the drugs for which he was charged.2 After a
hearing, the trial court denied the motion on the grounds that
the case was remanded for the sole purpose of resentencing Gordon
and that consideration of the motion was beyond the authority
granted to the court. Furthermore, the court denied the motion
on the merits, holding that (1) the prohibition against city
attorneys representing criminal defendants was not retroactive,
and (2) Gordon's "proffered affidavit of Danny Burke (a fellow
inmate) appears to be of dubious value."
Gordon appealed to the court of appeals from his 1983
conviction and resentencing and from the denial of his motion for
a new trial. Pursuant to rule 43 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, the court of appeals certified the case to this court
to resolve the issue of whether the prohibition in Brown should
be applied retroactively.
2

No affidavit of Mr. Burke was attached to the motion, and
there is no copy of it in the record, j
No. 940558
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III.
A.

ANALYSIS

Retroactivity of State v. Brown

In Brown, the defendant was represented by appointed
counsel who was also a part-time city prosecutor. Brown, 853
P.2d at 856. He was convicted of second degree murder and
aggravated assault. Id, at 852. On appeal, he contended that he
was denied due process and the effective assistance of counsel
when the court appointed a city prosecutor as his trial counsel.
We agreed and reversed, holding:
Although we do not decide whether it is
constitutionally impermissible to appoint a
city attorney with prosecutorial
responsibilities to represent an indigent
defendant, we conclude that vital interests
of the criminal justice system are
jeopardized when [it occurs]. Consequently,
we hold that as a matter of public policy and
pursuant to our inherent supervisory power
over the courts, as well as our express power
to govern the practice of law, counsel with
concurrent prosecutorial obligations may not
be appointed to defend indigent persons

. . . [W]e announce a per se rule of
reversal wherever such dual representation is
undertaken so as to prevent its recurrence.
Id. at 856-57, 859 (emphasis in original).
Initially Gordon contends that by ordering his
resentencing, this court ^explicitly recognized that the
prohibition against a part-time city prosecutor serving as an
appointed defense attorney is applicable to Defendant's case."
Gordon reads far too much into our order, which merely stated,
^Having decided that Gordon was denied his constitutional right
to appeal, this court remands the case to the trial court for
resentencing, so that Gordon may raise the issues here presented
in a first appeal as of right." The order clearly did not
address the merits of Gordon's conflict-of-interest argument. It
did not mention Brown or discuss its retroactivity. Rather, it
merely required Gordon to be resentenced so that he could raise
the argument on appeal.

5
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Next, Gordon asserts that our decision in Brown
entitles him to a new trial. Brown was expressly decided as a
matter of public policy under our inherent supervisory power over
the courts and our power to govern the practice of law, which
powers are well settled. Brown, 853 P.2d at 857; see State v.
Carter, 888 P.2d 629, €50 n.32 (Utah) (and cases cited therein),
cert- denied,
U.S.
, 116 S. Ct. 163, 133 L. Ed. 2d 105
(1995) . When we base a decision upon our supervisory power over
lower courts, it is a clear indication that the decision will
apply only to future cases. State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 407
n.7 (Utah 1994) (*[T]he invocation of our supervisory powers
. . . demonstrates a commitment on the part of this court to
prospectively prohibit the use of the offending language [in the
jury instruction at issue]." (emphasis added)), cert, denied,
U.S.
, 115 S. Ct. 910, 130 L. Ed. 2d 792 (1995).
Furthermore, our decision in Brown announced for the
first time that counsel with concurrent prosecutorial duties
could not represent indigent defendants, a clear change from past
procedures. We have previously held that when a new rule
governing criminal procedure constitutes a clear break with the
past, it is not generally applied retroactively. State v. Hoff,
814 P.2d 1119, 1123 (Utah 1991) (declining to retroactively apply
strict compliance of rule in taking of guilty pleas); Andrews v.
Morris, 677 P.2d 81, 95 (Utah 1983) (declining to retroactively
apply reasonable doubt standard of proof in sentencing defendant
convicted of capital offense); see also State v. Long, 721 P.2d
483, 492 (Utah 1986) ("from this date forward," defendants are
entitled to cautionary instruction regarding eyewitness testimony
when that testimony is a central issue).
In Brown, we expressly declined to decide whether the
appointment of attorneys with concurrent prosecutorial duties was
constitutionally impermissible. Brown, 853 P.2d at 856.
However, even where we have adopted a new rule that is of a
constitutional dimension, we have been reluctant to give it
retroactive effect. See, e.g., Neel v. Holden, 886 P.2d 1097,
1103-05 (Utah 1994) (due process affords inmates disclosure of
contents of their files, including psychological reports, prior
to parole hearing; decision to apply prospectively only); Labrum
v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 870 P.2d 902, 913-14 (Utah 1993);
Andrews, 677 P.2d at 88.
Other reasons favor only prospective application of
Brown. The primary purpose of the prohibition in Brown was
clearly prophylactic, that is, to forbid *such dual
representation • . . so as to prevent its recurrence." 853 P.2d
at 859 (emphasis added). Applying Brown retroactively would
unjustly benefit many defendants who received competent,
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effective assistance of counsel, despite their counsel's
concurrent prosecutorial duties. Finally, the goal of
maintaining the efficient administration of justice also strongly
favors the prospective application of Brown, See Labrum, 870
P.2d at 912; Andrews, 677 P.2d at 91 (both examining these
factors on collateral review in deciding against retroactivity).
Having concluded that the prohibition in Brown should
be applied only prospectively, we must determine whether on this
direct appeal, Gordon is nevertheless entitled to benefit from
its holding. In Menzies, one year after the defendant was
convicted, we disapproved of a ^reasonable doubt" jury
instruction in another case. 889 P.2d at 407 n.7. On appeal,
Menzies argued that he was entitled to benefit from the new case.
We concluded that our invocation of supervisory powers "is a
clear indication that we would strike down only future verdicts
based on the offending [jury instruction]." Id. (emphasis in
original). Thus, under Menzies, when under our supervisory
powers we articulate a new cautionary policy, the defendants on
appeal will not benefit from the new policy. Similarly, in Hoff
we held that the defendant on appeal did not benefit from State
v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1312 (Utah 1987), which mandated
strict compliance with the rule governing the taking of guilty
pleas. 814 P.2d at 1122. We concluded that Gibbons applied only
to guilty pleas taken after its issuance. Id. at 1124.
Likewise, we consistently limited the benefit of the cautionary
instruction on eyewitness identifications that we mandated in
State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 492 (Utah 1986), to cases tried
after its date of issuance. See State v. Griffiths, 752 P.2d
879, 881 n.3 (Utah 1988); State v. Branch, 743 P.2d 1187, 1190
(Utah 1987), cert, denied, 485 U.S. 1036 (1988); State v.
Suniville, 741 P.2d 961, 965 (Utah 1987); State v. Jonas, 725
P.2d 1378, 1380 (Utah 1986). We did so because we decided Long
under our supervisory powers, despite our concern that a
conviction without such an instruction *could well deny the
defendant due process of law under article I, section 7 of the
Utah Constitution." Long, 721 P.2d at 492.
We note that in two cases involving constitutional
issues, we applied prior holdings to claims pending in the
district court and to those on appeal. See State v. Taysom, 886
P.2d 513, 513 n.3 (Utah 1994) (addressing authority of court
commissioners); Labrum v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 870 P.2d
902, 913-14 (holding that inmates have due process right to
review information considered by parole board). However, these
cases do not apply here. In Brown, we merely articulated a new
cautionary policy under our supervisory powers. We conclude that
Gordon does not benefit from the prohibition in Brown since his
1983 trial occurred well before we issued Brown in 1992.

7
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Justice Stewart's dissent, joined by Justice Durham,
states that Brown "implicated a defendant's Sixth Amendment right
to counsel" and that "the issues underlying Brown are of a
constitutional nature." Yet the Brown opinion, authored just
three years ago by Justice Durham and joined by Justice Stewart
(writing a concurring opinion on another issue), examined the
conflict of interest question at length and concluded:
[W]e do not decide whether it is
constitutionally impermissible to appoint a
city attorney with prosecutorial
responsibilities to represent an indigent
defendant. . . .
[W]e hold that as a matter
of public policy and pursuant to our inherent
supervisory power over the courts, as well as
our express power to govern the practice of
law, counsel with concurrent prosecutorial
obligations may not be appointed to defend
indigent persons . . . .
Brown, 853 P.2d at 856-57 (emphasis in original). The dissent
would now apparently reverse Gordon's 1983 conviction because of
his constitutional right to have trial counsel who did not have
concurrent prosecutorial duties, even absent a showing of
prejudice. We had the clear opportunity to enunciate such a
holding in Brown but expressly refused to do so. We should not
do so now.
The dissent relies upon cases in which the conflict of
interest arose out of joint representation of multiple
defendants, where, for example, one codefendant elected to plead
guilty and testify against the other. See State v. Smith, 621
P.2d 697, 699 (Utah 1980). This represents a direct conflict of
interest. However, the conflict of interest faced by an
appointed defense counsel who also has concurrent prosecutorial
duties in another jurisdiction is much more remote. Here, where
Gordon was convicted in a trial conducted before we issued Brown,
we should require Gordon to show ineffective assistance of his
defense counsel.
B.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Although Gordon is not entitled to a per se reversal
because of his trial counsel's concurrent prosecutorial duties,
he is free to contend, and does contend, that he was denied due
process of law and the effective assistance of counsel as a
result of his counsel's representation. To demonstrate that his
defense counsel's assistance was so inadequate as to constitute
lack of counsel under the Sixth Amendment, Gordon must show that
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(1) his counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonable professional judgment, and (2) he was prejudiced by
the deficient performance. State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 111314 (Utah 1994) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
690-94, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)). These factors
are not applied as a mechanical test but are meant to help us
answer the ultimate question of whether the "defendant receive[d]
a fair trial." State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986).
Gordon contends that his trial counsel failed to
adequately investigate the possibility that the LSD underlying
his conviction belonged to another person. At the trial, Frigon
asserted that a "Mexican" woman named "Cathy" from West Valley
City and three other people whom she had never met came to her
apartment at approximately one o'clock the morning Gordon was
arrested, Cathy allegedly described some LSD that featured a
unicorn design like that on the LSD stamps police recovered from
Gordon's coat pocket. The visitors stayed an hour to an hour and
a half. According to Frigon, when she found the bag containing
the LSD later that morning, she assumed Cathy had mistakenly left
it. Frigon testified that because she was angry with Gordon, she
put the LSD in his coat pocket and called the police to have him
arrested. Just after Gordon was arrested, Cathy allegedly came
back to the apartment to reclaim the drugs. It was not until two
days later that Frigon told the police about Cathy. Gordon
asserts that his trial counsel failed to investigate whether the
LSD belonged to Cathy and the other visitors.
We have held that "a decision not to investigate cannot
be considered a tactical decision. It is only after an adequate
inquiry has been made that counsel can make a reasonable decision
to call or not to call particular witnesses for tactical
reasons." State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 188 (Utah 1990). In
Tempiin, we held that the defendant, convicted of rape, was
denied the effective assistance of counsel because his counsel
did not contact several potential witnesses named by the
defendant. Id. at 187-88. We reversed his conviction after
concluding that the witnesses could have bolstered the
defendant's assertion that the victim was a willing partner in
the sexual activity, the only issue in contention at trial. Id.
at 188-89.
This case is easily distinguishable from Templin
because Frigon was unable to identify the persons who were
allegedly in her apartment the morning of Gordon's arrest. She
testified that she did not know Cathy's last name or the names of
the other persons. Gordon's trial counsel cannot be faulted for
failing to contact these unidentified witnesses.

9
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Approximately two months after his trial, Gordon filed
a motion for a new trial in which he submitted the affidavit of a
fellow inmate at the Utah State Prison named Danny Burke. Burke
asserted therein that he had been at Frigon's Brigham City
apartment at approximately eleven o'clock the night before Gordon
was arrested. He left when Gordon did not return as Frigon
expected. According to Burke, it was not until he had returned
to Salt Lake City that he realized he had left his bag of LSD at
Frigon's apartment. Gordon admitted in his 1994 motion for a new
trial that Burke's testimony *was unavailable at the time of
Defendant's trial." That being the case, Gordon's trial counsel
again cannot be faulted for failing to contact this witness to
testify at trial.
Gordon has failed to demonstrate that his counsel's
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable
professional judgment. Therefore, we do not reach the second
prong of the Strickland test, whether Gordon was prejudiced by
his counsel's performance.
C. Motion for a New Trial
Following this court's September 24, 1993 order
remanding for resentencing, Gordon filed a motion for a new trial
based upon (1) ineffective assistance of trial counsel because of
his appointed defense counsel's concurrent position as a city
prosecutor, and (2) newly discovered evidence, i.e., the
testimony of Danny Burke. After a hearing, the trial court
denied the motion on the grounds that the case was remanded for
the sole purpose of resentencing Gordon and that consideration of
the motion was beyond the authority granted to the court.
Alternatively, the court also denied the motion on the merits.
Gordon contends that the postconviction motion was
properly before the trial court. We disagree. The order
expressly "remand[ed] the case to the trial court for
resentencing, so that Gordon may raise the issues here presented
in a first appeal as of right." The only effect of the order was
to provide Gordon with another opportunity to pursue the direct
appeal that he was previously denied. In other words, Gordon's
resentencing merely returned him to the position he was in before
his appeal was dismissed. It did not allow him another
opportunity to present postconviction motions.
In

Hallett, cited in our order remanding for
resentencing, the trial court on postconviction review determined
that the defendant had been denied his right to appeal. Hallett,
856 P.2d at 1061. Rather than merely resentencing him so that he
could pursue an appeal, the trial court proceeded to consider the
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merits of the other claims raised in the defendant's habeas
proceeding. Id. at 1062. We held that the trial court erred in
doing so because its action was contrary to the well-established
principle that postconviction proceedings are not meant to be
substitutes for direct appellate review and because it gave the
defendant an adjudication on the merits to which he was not
entitled. Id. We held:
Once a trial court on habeas review
determines that a defendant has been denied
the constitutional right to appeal, a direct
appeal should be provided immediately/
without adjudication of any other claims,
such as ineffective assistance of counsel.
Id. (emphasis added) . Although in this case it was an appellate
court on habeas review which determined that Gordon had been
denied his right to appeal, our holding in Hallett applies here.
The trial court correctly determined that it was inappropriate to
adjudicate Gordon's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
and newly discovered evidence.3
We affirm Gordon's conviction.

Chief Justice Zimmerman and Justice Russon concur in
Justice Howe's opinion.

STEWART, Associate Chief Justice, dissenting:
I dissent.
The majority holds that appointed defense counsel's
conflict of interest arising out of his position as a part-time
city prosecutor is not reversible error although we held such a
conflict to be per se reversible error in State v. Brown, 853
P.2d 851 (Utah 1992) . The majority reaches its conclusion by
3

In State v. Rawlings, 829 P.2d 150, 154 (Utah Ct. App.
1992), the court of appeals stated, *When resentencing takes
place to allow a first appeal of right, as set forth in Johnson,
this should not rule out the procedural possibility that postconviction motions may be appropriately heard in the sentencing
court." Insofar as Rawlings departs from our analysis here and
i n Hallett, it is disavowed.

11

No. 940558

reasoning that Brown should not be applied retroactively. I
submit that the majority ignores precedent from both this Court
and the United States Supreme Court that mandates reversal
notwithstanding the issue of whether Brown itself should have
retroactive effect. Brown was based on this Court's supervisory
authority, but that case nevertheless implicated a defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Regardless of whether the
specific holding in Brown is applicable, the Sixth Amendment
issue is raised whenever a defendant's attorney has a conflict of
interest; yet the majority barely discusses it. I also disagree
with the majority's conclusion that the holding in Brown is
unavailing to Gordon. Because the issues underlying Brown are of
a constitutional nature, the Supreme Court's holding in Griffith
v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987), requires this Court to
follow the federal rule applying all judicial decisions
retroactively. I would therefore hold that the judgment must be
reversed.
I. VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Whether our decision in Brown should apply
retroactively is irrelevant to the central issue in this case.
At the time of Gordon's and Brown's trials, this Court and the
United States Supreme Court had already treated the issue of the
impact of serious conflicts of interest upon a defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel and due process. Those decisions thus
constituted established precedent before Gordon ever came to
trial. In State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 856-57 (Utah 1992), we
chose not to address these constitutional issues. It is
nevertheless clear that the Constitution is implicated in
situations where defense counsel are also part-time prosecutors.
Hence, if the majority here wishes to conclude that Gordon's
trial was not constitutionally flawed, it cannot simply rely on
the proposition that Brown is inapplicable because it was based
on our so-called supervisory power rather than on the
constitutional right to counsel itself. The Court must show that
the Sixth Amendment and Due Process Clauses were not violated in
this case, or that if they were violated the error is somehow
harmless. Yet the majority opinion accords only the most cursory
treatment to these unavoidable constitutional issues.
In doing so, the majority opinion notes, *We had the
clear opportunity to enunciate such a [constitutional] holding in
Brown but expressly refused to do so." This is true. In Brown
we merely followed the principle that constitutional issues ought
to be avoided when another basis for decision is available.
Because we reversed Brown's conviction on that other basis,
constitutional analysis became superfluous—not because it was
not pertinent to the issues raised, but because it could not
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influence the outcome. In this case, however, where the majority
claims it can find no state law ground for reversal, the federal
issues must, in that event, be addressed. The purported absence
of a state law ground for decision does not make the federal
ground magically disappear.
Before either Brown or Gordon came to trial, it was
well established that *the assistance of counsel is among those
^constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their
infraction can never be treated as harmless error.'" Holloway v.
Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 489 (1978) (quoting Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967)). In that regard, the United
States Supreme Court has held that where there is an
unconstitutional conflict of interest, it will not ^indulge in
nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from [the
resulting] denial [of the assistance of counsel]." Glasser v.
United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942); see Cuyler v. Sullivan,
446 U.S. 335, 348-50 (1980); Holloway, 435 U.S. at 490; see also
Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271-72 (1981) (holding same on due
process grounds). Rather, prejudice will be presumed and the
judgment reversed. This Court rendered the same holding and
adopted the same rule in State v. Smith, 621 P.2d 697, 699 (Utah
1980). In that case, one attorney represented two codefendants.
One codefendant elected to plead guilty and testify against the
other. Relying on Holloway, this Court held that such a conflict
of interest required a per se reversal of Smith's conviction.
Id.
Because Glasser and much of its progeny were cases in
which the conflict of interest arose out of joint representation
of multiple defendants and because such joint representation may
actually be appropriate in certain cases, Holloway, 435 U.S. at
482-83 (stating that "certain advantages might accrue from joint
representation"), the Supreme Court has required the factual
predicate of an objection to a conflict of interest before the
per se reversal rule may be invoked: "[A] defendant who raised
no objection [to the conflict of interest] at trial must
demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely
affected his lawyer's performance." Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348.*
1

Prior to Cuyler, this Court held in Smith, "*The law will
not assume that counsel has advised his client of his
inadequacies or those of his associates.'" 621 P.2d at 699
(quoting Commonwealth v. Via, 316 A.2d 895, 898 (Pa. 1974)).
Gordon was not informed of his attorney's conflict of interest
and had no reason to suspect it. Arguably then, notwithstanding
Cuyler, Gordon is entitled to application of the more lenient
(Footnote continued on the next page.)
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In reference to the facts of Gordon's case, however, it is clear
that it has never been appropriate for an appointed defense
attorney to simultaneously function as a part-time city
prosecutor.2 Brown established that "it is clear that conflicts
of interest inhere whenever a city prosecutor is appointed to
represent an indigent defendant."3 853 P.2d at 858; see also
People v. Washington, 461 N.E.2d 393, 395-97 (111.) (applying per
se reversal rule in case where part-time prosecutor acted as
defense counsel), cert, denied, 469 U.S. 1022 (1984).4 Yet the

1

(Footnote continued.)
Holloway rule because he had no plausible reason for suspecting
his attorney's conflict, whereas, in the Cuyler line of cases,
the conflict was reasonably apparent even to the individual
defendants.
2

The majority asserts that Brown was prophylactic in
nature. A reading of that case, however, admits no such
interpretation. The language proscribing the dual role of
prosecutor and defender in Brown unequivocally asserts that the
"vital interests of the criminal justice system are jeopardized
when a city prosecutor is appointed to assist in the defense of
an accused." Brown, 853 P.2d at 856-57. If, as the majority now
claims, retroactive application of Brown "would unjustly benefit
many defendants," then it is difficult to understand why we
elected in Brown to impose such a harsh consequence on appeal for
conflicts of interest involving part-time prosecutors serving as
defense counsel.
3

It should be noted that this particular point essentially
served as a factual basis for this Court's legal conclusion
setting forth the consequences of the self-evident conflict.
Even assuming that the legal consequences of Brown (i.e., a per
se reversal based on supervisory authority) are not
"retroactively" applicable to Gordon's case, we are certainly
entitled to rely on Brown as evidence establishing the factual
predicate for a per se reversal pursuant to the constitutional
grounds set forth in Glasser and its progeny.
4

It must be conceded that there is contra authority in
other jurisdictions. Mitchell v. Maggio, 679 F.2d 77, 79-80 (5th
Cir.), cert, denied, 459 U.S. 912 (1982), held without any
supporting citations that the Sixth Amendment does not require a
per se reversal when a part-time city prosecutor acts as a
defense attorney. The same circuit recently limited the
applicability of the per se reversal rule to situations involving
"multiple representation" despite a complete lack of any textual
(Footnote continued on the next page.)
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majority persists in asserting that the potential for prejudice
arising from a conflict when ^defense counsel . . . has
concurrent prosecutorial duties . . . is much more remote'' than
the potential for prejudice arising out of a conflict due to
*joint representation of multiple defendants." This assertion is
supremely ironic because now under the law in Utah, concurrent
representation of codefendants is permitted in appropriate
circumstances, see Holloway, 435 U.S. at 482-83, while under no
circumstances may a part-time prosecutor represent any criminal
defendant anywhere. If Brown established anything, it is the
principle that the factual predicate of an actual conflict of
interest is always present when a part-time prosecutor acts as a
defense attorney. Brown, 853 P.2d at 856-57, 859. A logical
constitutional analysis requires that Gordon's conviction be
reversed.
II.

APPLICABILITY OF RETROACTIVITY ANALYSIS

The majority also fails to recognize that Brown is
applicable to this case even under retroactivity analysis.
Because Brown could have been decided on federal constitutional
grounds, this Court is bound by the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987), which
unequivocally held that "a new rule for the conduct of criminal
prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state
or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final, with no
exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a *clear
break' with the past." Id. (emphasis added). "The Supremacy
Clause . . . does not allow federal retroactivity doctrine to be
supplanted by the invocation of a contrary approach to

4

(Footnote continued.)
evidence that the Supreme Court intended to impose such a
limitation. Beets v. Scott, 65 F.3d 1258, 1272 (5th Cir. 1995).
The Iowa Court of Appeals in Bumgardner v, State, 401 N.W.2d 211,
213-14 (Iowa Ct. App. 1986), also declined to adopt a per se rule
under the part-time prosecutor fact pattern. Bumgardner,
however, virtually ignores pertinent constitutional authority in
favor of policy reasoning avoiding the disqualification of all
part-time prosecutors in rural counties where it would be
difficult to appoint a defense attorney who did not have such a
conflict of interest. In light of our holding in Brown, we can
hardly employ similar policy reasoning in this case.
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retroactivity under state law."5 Harper v. Virginia Dep't of
Taxation, 113 S. Ct. 2510, 2519 (1993).
The majority attempts to circumvent this mandate by
noting that Brown was expressly based on our "supervisory power"
and holding that when we invoke that power, "it is a clear
indication that the decision will apply only to future cases."6
Yet, as I have already pointed out, our choice of that analytical
path cannot eliminate the underlying constitutional concerns.
Under the majority's analysis, any time we face a constitutional
issue, we can simply assert our supervisory authority as an
alternate basis for decision and thereby render the ruling in
Griffith a nullity when it comes time to address the
retroactivity of the underlying case. Although Harper

5

The majority claims that "even where we have adopted a new
rule that is of constitutional dimension, we have been reluctant
to give it retroactive effect." This assertion is incorrect.
"In the vast majority of cases, the stated law of a decision is
effective both prospectively and retrospectively, even a decision
which overrules prior law. Therefore, unless a substantial
injustice would occur from retrospective application, we will
apply a decision both prospectively and retrospectively." Heslop
v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828, 835 (Utah 1992). In any event,
Griffith and Harper make clear that we are not at liberty to be
"reluctant" when it comes to affording retroactive effect to
decisions of a "constitutional dimension."
6

The majority here misconstrues our prior precedent. For
support, the majority relies upon dicta contained in a footnote
in State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 406-07 n.7 (Utah 1994). The
Menzies majority, responding to my dissent in that case, briefly
treated the issue of whether the holdings in State v. Johnson,
774 P.2d 1141, 1147-48 (Utah 1989) (Stewart, J., concurring in
the result, joined by Zimmerman and Durham, JJ.) (invalidating
inappropriate language in a jury instruction), and State v.
Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375, 1380 (Utah 1989) (same), applied
retroactively. The Menzies majority, apparently relying in part
on the fact that the stated authority underlying Johnson and
Ireland was our supervisory power, asserted that their holding
applied only prospectively. That is nonetheless a far cry from
holding that all decisions grounded in our so-called supervisory
power—whatever that means apart from our appellate power—are
ineligible for the retroactive application that is traditionally
accorded to judicial decisions. State v. Norton, 675 P.2d 577,
583 (Utah 1983), overruled on other grounds, State v. Hansen, 734
P.2d 421, 427 (Utah 1986); see also Heslop, 839 P.2d at 835;
Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 676 (Utah 1984).
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acknowledged the availability of differing retroactivity analysis
on purely state law grounds, 113 S. Ct. at 2519, I doubt
seriously that the United States Supreme Court would permit the
majorityfs subterfuge if a case such as Gordon's were brought
before it on a writ of certiorari. The holding in Brown provides
neither an independent nor an adequate state law ground for
ignoring the requirements of Griffith. Harper, 113 S. Ct. at
2518-19.
Likewise, the majority's holding that Brown falls
within one of the exceptions to the general rule of retroactivity
that a "new rule governing criminal procedure [which] constitutes
a clear break with the past" is also explicitly barred by
Griffith. 479 U.S. at 328. And even if we were at liberty to
apply it, the policy reason behind it—refraining from punishing
prosecutors post facto for violating procedural rules that were
not in force at the time of trial—would not be present.7 Brown
did not establish a procedural rule constituting a clear break
with the past. It merely dictated the consequences on appeal of
a conflict of interest occurring in the trial court. Because it
would have been prudent and reasonable to assume, even prior to
Brown, that the appointment of defense counsel who was also a
part-time city prosecutor within the same county could constitute
an impermissible conflict of interest, Brown did not create any
new procedural rules. If anything, given the available precedent
which I have already discussed, courts should have been on notice
that such a conflict could result in precisely the consequence
ultimately dictated by Brown.
In sum, I submit that defendant is entitled to a
reversal of his conviction and a new trial.

Justice Durham concurs in Associate Chief Justice
Stewart's dissenting opinion.

7

The majority argues that applying the rule in Brown to
this case will harm the "efficient administration of justice." I
disagree. Giving Gordon the benefit of this Court's ruling in
Brown will cause no disruption of any significance in the
criminal justice system. If there be other defendants who are
incarcerated as a result of trials in which they were represented
by part-time city prosecutors, their cases would have to come
before the courts on writs of habeas corpus, and the rules of law
that would apply under those circumstances are entirely different
from the rule that should prevail here.
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